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BOOK NOTE
AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL
FESSION: ERWIN 0.
LAWYER *

STUDY OF THE LEGAL PROSMIGEL, THE WALL STREET

Walter 0. Weyrauch t
A number of empirical studies of the legal profession have been published in recent years.' Some of them have relied on standardized methods
of inquiry amenable to statistical analysis; others may be called anthropological studies of lawyers and, in a wider sense, of law. The Wall Street
Lawyer seems to fit into the latter category-indeed the author has referred
to his efforts as related to the field work of the social anthropologist.
(Pp. 30-34.) 2

This approach has resulted methodologically in less emphasis on
quantification and statistical evaluation, and in greater reliance on pursuing pertinent information from all available sources, regardless of its
amenability to categorization in a preconceived plan. We may view the
author as a traveler into an uncharted region, Wall Street, intrigued by
the customs of a foreign tribe, the Wall Street lawyers, taking notes of
whatever appears worthy of observation. The result is a wealth of factual
* New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. Pp. xiv, 369. $6.95.
t Professor of Law, University of Florida. Dr. iur. 1951, University of Frankfort,
Germany; LL.B. 1955, Georgetown University; LL.M. 1956, Harvard University;
J.S.D. 1962, Yale University. Professor Weyrauch is the author of THE PERSONALITY
OF LAWYERS (1964).
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paper in University of North Carolina Law Library) [hereinafter cited as Agger &
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(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, microfilmed, in University of Chicago Library);
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information, which in a standardized and quantified analysis might have
been overlooked. He has noticed habits of dress, residential preferences,
patterns of speech, demeanor, idiosyncrasies, and other matters that at first
may appear trivial, but in the total context acquire significance.
One of the merits of The Wall Street Lawyer is that it is a study of
an elite. Smigel, who is not a lawyer, has had the courage, perhaps the
temerity, to describe what he saw and to describe it in balance. Despite
the abundance of studies of the common man and of the deprived strata
of the population, social scientists have shied away from elites,3 not surprisingly in view of the fact that elites are ordinarily engaged in selfassertion rather than self-study. Standing only to lose, they are likely
to distrust the intruder who wants to study them. On the other hand, the
intruding social scientist is more immune from deprivations than, let us
say, a law professor who studies lawyers. The social scientist, however,
does have a legitimate interest in not diluting or cutting off his sources
of information. He may want to return at a later time to the culture or
subculture described in his publication. This requires a certain amount of
tact or diplomacy, a balancing of the gains and losses from unfettered
scientific disclosure with the potential benefits that may flow from continued friendly relations with his populace. Smigel has done remarkably
well in these respects without compromising his high standards as a scholar.
Even though the book contains material that can be viewed as derogatory,
it is not probable that his treatment will be resented by Wall Street lawyers
or by lawyers in general.
Methods of presentation are of help. In the early part of the book,
credit is given to the public services of lawyers who started in large law
firms. (Pp. 8-12.) In the conclusion the organization of large law firms
is offered as a model for other professional work groups because of its
combination of the advantages of bigness and specialization with a minimum
of bureaucracy. There is praise for the professionalism of the Wall Street
lawyer "which sets the stage for his creativity-a required ingredient when
dealing with the esoteric, the difficult, and the exceptional." (P. 354.)
Smigel also has emphasized that "disputation," within proper bounds,4 is
traditionally expected among lawyers even in the same office, since it
sharpens issues to the benefit of clients and helps in the preparation of
cases. Smigel has a valid claim to the same brand of leniency in presenting
his well-balanced critique.
Style and choice of words are used in a fashion that, while giving
necessary details, minimizes the danger of adverse reaction. It does make
a difference, for example, whether one refers to reprehensible acts that have
occurred in a law firm or merely to indiscretions and laxities. (Pp. 2298LAsswFLL,

THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

184 (1963).

4The limits of propriety are established by "good judgment" and custom.
SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER 260-61, 322-29 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
SmiGI in footnotes]. A lawyer who clashes with the value preferences of a superior
or who is perhaps of improper background may be in danger of being considered
"contentious."
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30.) I point out these factors because they are interesting in themselves.
We may ask ourselves whether we lawyers are so awe-inspiring that these
and other precautions are in order; or whether threatening appearance is
a characteristic of all elites; or to what extent the outsider who studies
an elite necessarily approaches it with undue apprehension. 5
A positive consequence of cautious approaches is the possible appeal of
Smigel's study to a large group of prospective readers. In spite of the
seemingly narrow topic, the book can be read with profit for a variety of
reasons. Readers may concentrate on a depth analysis of lawyers, a study
of institutional patterns, or they may dwell on more superficial levels of
office management and career strategies.
Certainly the neophyte lawyer about to enter a large law firm as an
associate will be aided by a realistic assessment of his environment and his
career chances. He should know that his advancement in the firm may
depend only in part on professional competence, and that ethnic, social
and regional background, and attendance of the "right" educational institutions have a bearing too. Not only is he expected to dress properly, in the
same fashion as the business executives with whom he may have eventual
contacts, but also to live at a proper address. He may be disturbed to learn
that there is a statistical correlation between his address as an associate
and his chances of becoming a partner. (Pp. 314-16.)
Law partners may read the book to appraise their own firms, even if
smaller than the firms described and located outside of the Wall Street
district or New York City. Smigel's observations of the Wall Street
lawyer probably describe future patterns of the legal profession; we are
witnessing a trend toward bigness and specialization in American law
firms.
Any inquisitive reader, even a nonlawyer, will find the discussion of
recruitment, work, and milieu fascinating: the description of the status
hierarchy; the club-like atmosphere where even today eighty-eight percent
of the partners have a "right" college or "acceptable" law school background (p. 74) ; where one is circumspect, methodical, prudent, disciplined,
and expresses oneself with modesty; where the client is Standard Oil, perhaps even a foreign nation, Russia, Great Britain, or Japan; where the
office is organized along what resembles caste and class lines, one "caste"
being the professional people, the other the nonprofessional help; where it
might be excusable for a lawyer to marry a secretary, but not to go out
with her; where the partners and associates within the same caste form
separate classes, the associates being treated as inferior and equal at the
same time; where the lower strata of the population are everpresent in
a subdued role yet not without a power of their own, whether as managing
5There is some evidence that caution may be in order in studying the legal
profession. Scholars who have attempted such studies have beei severely criticized,
sometimes ridiculed. For an illustration, see Rogers, Book Review, 61 COLUM. L.
REv. 308 (1961) (reviewing SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIvE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1960)).
For the reaction of a Chicago individual practitioner to Carlin's
Lawyers on Their Own, see Ross, Book Review, 12 DE PAUL L. Rxv. 369 (1963).
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clerks of Jewish or Irish extraction with a law degree from a local night
school and with the function of facilitating communication between the
lower level officials in the courts and the Ivy-League lawyers in the firm
(pp. 42, 119, 244-45), or as members of the nonprofessional staff (down
to the messengers) who have their impact on the office milieu and thus on
the lawyers who depend on them just as much as they depend on the
lawyers.
In enumerating these and other criteria it is difficult to establish any
list or logical sequence because the various categories of status blend;
similarly, it may be difficult to determine whether an individual lawyer is a
failure or a success. (Pp. 77-85.) Furthermore, recruitment and organizational patterns are interdependent. Lawyers of nonacceptable background or nonconforming personality, for instance, are either excluded in
the hiring phase or eventually eased out, a process that results in a relatively homogeneous group remaining in the law firm; this homogeneity in
culture and perspectives in turn is reflected in the organization of the law
firm. Few formal rules are needed, and it becomes possible to have a wellfunctioning yet loosely-knit organization. In fact insistence on rules is
somewhat frowned upon, and an associate who adheres to them too strictly
may hurt his chances for a partnership. Office manuals are likely to be
mislaid by the associates, and the partners pride themselves that they either
do not need a written partnership agreement or at most one drawn in
general terms, perhaps one page in length. (Pp. 211-16.)
Yet homogeneity, while facilitating smooth operation of big law firms,
has its pitfalls too. Standardization through formal rules may be partly
replaced by the compulsory aspects inherent in any standardization of
personality. Some of the disturbing observations in Smigel's study, mentioned more or less incidentally, are perhaps related to this possibility. In
speaking of the merits of law review editing, a fledgling lawyer has stated:
"One other experience that work on the law review provides is that you
learn to work hard and also at night. If I only worked from 9 to 5,
1 wouldn't know what to do with the rest of my time." (P. 254.) (Emphasis added.)
In close context to this Smigel has tried to construct a model of an
average associate's concept of self: "I feel that I am capable, responsible,
and intelligent; that I have received superior training and that success in
some form is inevitable; that I am destined to deal with important people
and matters." (P. 255.)
This model is not unrealistic or exaggerated; there are indeed lawyers
who apparently think of themselves in these terms or at least try to live
up to this image. The image is, of course, disturbing in its indication of
limited horizons, intellectually and otherwise. Perhaps it illustrates what
has been referred to in another context as "trained incapacity." (P. 343.)
While it may be doubted that the kind, of person reflected in this model will
ultimately succeed, for example, by being selected for partnership, it is true
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that men of limited vision but of compulsive drives have sometimes been
surprisingly successful.
Smigel has opened up numerous avenues of further inquiry. His
comparative remarks on law firms and law schools, lawyers and law
professors are fascinating. They are dispersed throughout the book but
worthy of systematic collection and study.6 American law faculties may be
viewed, for instance, as associations of lawyers that are in many respects
similar to law firms. Some faculties exceed Smigel's criterion of bigness,
fifty members. Recruitment and career patterns of lawyers and law professors show many parallel features, and continued exchange takes place
from law firms to law faculties and vice versa. Law schools, too, have few
formal regulations. 7 Selective recruitment and the relative homogeneity of
faculties, following Smigel's reasoning, may have made such regulations
unnecessary.
Large law firms, too, have acquired more and more of the characteristics of law schools. They have become postgraduate vocational schools
with a supervised educational program and a form of graduation, either
elevation to partnership or transferal to an important position outside the
law firm. They have created strong bonds of allegiance between the firm
and the scores of alumni who do not become partners, but who leave under
favorable conditions. Their later careers, whether in industry, government,
or law practice, often lead to continued contacts beneficial to the firm's
business. The unwritten policy that it is improper to fire a lawyer and
that a firm is responsible for taking care of former associates "pays off"
in continued loyalties, a stable clientele, and influential connections that
permit short cuts. (Pp. 62-65, 262.) Similar notions are not unknown
in the academic world.
It is sometimes objected that studies of this kind are fragmentary and
that the generalizations drawn from small samples are speculative 8 In a
sense this may be true if the criticism is focused on a single study. However, there is now a steadily growing body of knowledge resulting from the
efforts of different researchers who have employed a variety of research
techniques and who have independently reached surprisingly uniform conclusions that often transcend form of practice and even culture. It is possible to draft a kind of cross-index from Smigel's findings to other studies :
6
E.g., comparisons of job mobility, SMIGEL 111 n.6; managing partners to university administrators, id. at 238; ethics of law students, professors, and attorneys,
id. at 289 n.21; academic freedom to professional independence, id. at 349-50.
7 See Richard, Faculty Regulations of American Law Schools, 13 CLEV.-MA.
L. REv. 581 (1964).
8 See Frey, Book Review, 13 BusFALo L. REV. 293 (1963) ; Ross, supra note 5.
Both reviews were of Carlin's Lawyers on Their Own. The criticism coincides with
standard objections to anthropological methods: poor workmanship in detail, insufficient attention to quantitative method, greater interest in producing hypotheses than
in testing them, more description of the personality of the field worker than of the
culture in question. See Kluckhohn, supra note 2, at 257-67.
9 Emphasis is on references to the books by Smigel and Weyrauch that were
simultaneously published and of different research design and scope, one based on
interviews with Wall Street lawyers, the other on interviews with German lawyers.
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Lawyers cherish a notion of being autonomous and adhere to a
philosophy of individualism.' 0 However, interviewing a small sample
soon results in repetitious responses on major issues and, therefore, a
collective portrait of a relatively homogeneous group is possible.',
Lawyers are reserved toward the social sciences and object to institutional studies of the legal profession in much the same manner as clergymen
object to a study of the church.' 2 They put a high premium on hard work,
legal skills, and professional responsibilities. 18 They are devoted to the law
in the sense of a quest for the absolute,' 4 claim intuitive powers, 15 and are
concerned with relevancies and procedures. 16 Upper-level lawyers may
be fascinated by aesthetics ' 7 and may deplore not having chosen an
academic career.'" Lawyers are concerned with status and prestige, think
in terms of hierarchies, and show deference to seniority 19 and confidential
relationships. 0 They possess esprit de corps and are governed by a largely
unwritten code of behavior. 2 They tend to worry and are concerned with
questions of security. 22 Lawyers specializing in large scale financial transactions or aspiring to high professional standards consider it improper to
talk about finances or about questions relating to income and investments.
They complain about being burdened by corporate clients with business
decisions, and stress that in their professional relations to law partners and
associates money or property is of no concern.P
Their recruitment and career patterns follow ethnic lines with a
premium for "clean-cut" appearances and the "right" educational and social
1

oCAR.m

184-88; SIGEI. 224, 293; WEYRAUCH 78 n.3, 248-49, 278; Ladinsky

129; Riesman, Law and Sociology 670.

See also Brown, Legal Research: The

Resource Base and TraditionalApproaches, American Behavioral Scientist, Dec. 1963,
pp. 3, 6.
1 2SSMIGEL 14, 30; WEYRAUCH 41, 278-79.
SMIGEL 18-19; WEYRAUCH 75-95; FREEMAN 235, 245 (as to psychology);
Riesman, Law and Sociology 651, 660. Young lawyers are more tolerant. SMIGEL 19;

WEYRAUCH 93-95.
13 SmIGEL 252-54, 266; WEYRAuciH 278, 287-89; Riesman, Law and Sociology
648-49.
14 SmilGms 255; WEYRAUCH 169, 274-75, 279. See also LLEWELLYN, THE B.AMnIE
BUsH-ON OUR LAw AND ITS STUDY 119 (1951)

[hereinafter cited as LLEWELLYN];

Riesman, Toward an Anthropological Science of Law and the Legal Profession, 57
AMERICAN J. SOCIO.OGY '121, 133 (1951).
15 SMIGEL 260-62, 333 ("good judgment') ; WEYRAuca 173-77, 184-85; FREEMAN
235-36. See also LLEWELLYN 98; Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function
of the 'Hunch' in Judicial Decisions, 14 CORNEI. L.Q. 274 (1929).
16 SMIGEL 25; WEYRAUCH 66 n.1, 245, 266, 288-90; Rueschemeyer 20-21.
LLEWELLYN 102, 143.
17 SMaIGEL 10-11; WEYRAUCH 70-72.

See also

18 SMxIGF. 15-16 n.30, 205, 302; WEYRAUCH 127, 130-31.
19 CARIN 173-84; SMIGEL 63-64, 228-33, 257, 346-47; WEYRAUCH 51-53, 121-45,

278-79; Agger & Goldstein 26-27; FREEMAN 232, 234, 236-37 (authoritarian, more at
ease with older people) ; Krastin 426-27, 437-38; Ladinsky 128-34, 142-44.
20 CARLIN 93-97; SMIGEL 18, 303, 355 n.12; WEYRAUCH 266 (privileged communications)
; FREEMAN 5-16.
21

SmIGEL 256, 259-66; WEYRAucH 3, 139-45.
22 CARLIN 168-72, 190-92; SMIGEL 77, 334-36; WEYRAUCH 198-210.

23 SMIGEL 18, 26, 81, 211 ("property does not exist for us"), 246 n.8, 303-04;
WYRAucH 187-210. On the self-contempt of lower-level practitioners for being
"in business," see CAnuN 168-72, 192-95.
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24
background, preferably white, Protestant, Anglo-Saxon, Ivy-League.
They favor the social and economic status quo, cautious change not being
26
foreclosed.2 5 They have misgivings toward the press and publicity.
Emotional involvement with clients is considered improper; yet in many
respects-for instance, as to style of life and ideology-lawyers identify
with them.27 Lawyers are often discontent, dissatisfied with what they do,
28
and subject to strains and dilemmas.
Smigel points out that in recent years promising trends toward
democratization have taken place. For example, there has been less emphasis on social criteria of selection and more on intelligence and professional competence. (Pp. 236-38, 352-53.) 29 Even though this is probably
a correct observation, perhaps a caveat should be added. The question of
intelligence and professional competence, seemingly based on measurable
criteria and merit, is actually often based on submerged value preferences
that may reflect older cultural predispositions. The same persons and
groups that were excluded in the past because of their "improper" background, may have a hard time in the future because of purportedly insufficient competence or personality. 0 In fact it may be more difficult to refute
selective factors that are seemingly based on intellectual and personal competence, especially since the persons engaged in recruitment ordinarily in
good faith firmly believe in the absolute validity of their standards. There
is some evidence that the emphasis of discriminatory strategies is shifting
to this largely unconscious level. However, I can only sympathize with
Smigel for not casting this doubt on our hopes and aspirations.

24 C a IN 3-27, 129-32, 168-81; SmiG_ 37 ("Nordic"), 39-40, 44-45, 72-74,
172-75; WEYAucH 44-45, 111-12, 225-30, 241-43; FREEMAN 234; Krastin 421 n.21;
Ladinsky 130-32, 136-39, 143-44; Riesman, Law and Sociology 664-65; Rueschemeyer
23-25.
25 SMIGEL. 17-19, 253, 342; WEYRAucH 46, 274, 277-84; Agger & Goldstein 25-26;
FREEMAN 232 (conservatism) ; Krastin 421 n.21, 454; Riesman, Law and Sociology
659. See also Aubert, Researches in the Sociology of Law, American Behavioral
Scientist, Dec. 1963, pp. 16, 20.
26 SMaIGEz 18-20, 223, 320-21; WEYRAUCH 137, 139 (publicity harms prestige),
158, 168, 228; Rueschemeyer 18-19.
27 CAu.IN 95-97, 129-32, 164; SMIGEL 265, 314-22; WEYRAUCH 268-70; FREEmAN
235, 237; Gold 84; Krastin 426-27; Ladinsky 139, 143; Riesman, Law and Sociology
664, 670-71 ("guilt by association!); Rueschemeyer 22-30. See also LLEWELYN
148-51; Probert, Law and Persuasion: The Language-Behavior of Lawyers, 108
U. PA. L. RE. 35 (1959) (veiled appeals to emotion).
28 CARLIN 168-205; SMIGEL 15-16 n.30, 292-310; WEYRA CH 29-30, 115-19, 146-68,
246-84. See also LLEwELLYN 119-21; Mazor, Book Review, 8 UTAH L. REv. 283,
286-87 (1963).
29 But see as to ethnic and religious discriminations, SmiGEI. 44-45, 65-67, 140
n.7; Note, The Jewish Law Student and New York Jobs-DiscriminatoryEffects in
Law Firm Hiring Practices,73 YALE L.J. 625 (1964). Members of minority groups
may succeed in the recruitment process if they have absorbed the styles of life and
value preferences of the dominant culture, and if they are neither too aggressive nor
too accommodating and especially qualified under conventional standards.
ao The grading process, aptitude tests, and admission standards in formal education probably reflect, to some extent at least, an underlying cultural bias. They
may be viewed in the context of a recruitment pattern that begins with infancy.
Even after these hurdles have been overcome, a hiring partner or committee may
conclude that a job applicant is "not really that good" or that "he is not the kind
of person we are looking for." See also note 4 supra.

